

STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COUNTY OF AIKEN

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

HENRY DARGAN MCMASTER, in his
capacity as Attorney General of the State
of South Carolina; DARYL J. BROWN,
on behalf of his minor children, LINDSEY
DELORES BROWN and JANISE
VANISHA BROWN; DEANNA J.
BROWN THOMAS, on behalf of her minor
children, [REDACTED];
YAMMA N. BROWN, on behalf of her
minor children, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] and [REDACTED]
BROWN; VANISHA BROWN; and
LARRY BROWN; TOMMIE RAE
HYNIE BROWN

Petitioners,

- vs -

RUSSELL L. BAUKNIGHT,
as Special Administrator and Special
Trustee for The Estate of James Brown
and The James Brown 2000 Irrevocable
Trust, TERRY BROWN, ROMUNZO
BROWN; FORLANDO BROWN;
CINNAMON N.M. PARIS; LARHONDA
PETITT; and JEANNETTE MITCHELL

Respondents.

In Re:

The Estate of James Brown and The James
Brown 2000 Irrevocable Trust u/a/d
August 1, 2000

Case No.: 08-CP-02-1647 - original

(Case No.: 07-CP-02-0122) - cert. copy
(Estate of James Brown)

(Case No.: 08-CP-02-00872) - cert. copy
(Wills/Trust/Heirs Matter)

**ORDER APPROVING
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT**

FILED

5-26-09

Liz Adair
C.C.P. & G.S.

Anita Knoepfle
Deputy Clerk

945
APR

This matter comes before the Court on a Motion for Approval of Settlement Agreement.

The Court commenced the hearing on January 30, 2009, and continued to conduct that hearing

DAG
#1

on March 4, 5, 6, 25, and 26, 2009, and concluded the hearing on April 6, 2009. The following counsel appeared at the hearing related to the Motion for Settlement Approval: (1) Louis Levenson, counsel for Deanna J. Brown, Larry Brown, Yamma N. Brown, individually and on behalf of her minor children [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Vanisha Brown, Daryl J. Brown, individually and on behalf of his minor children child [REDACTED] [REDACTED] (2) Robert N. Rosen, S. Alan Medlin, T. Heyward Carter, David L. Michel, M. Jean Lee, Andrew W. Chandler, and F. Patricia Scarborough, counsel for Tommie Rae Hynie Brown; (3) Tressa Hayes and James D. Bailey, counsel for Adele J. Pope and Robert L. Buchanan, Jr., (4) A. Peter Shahid, Jr., counsel for Guardian ad Litem Stephen M. Slotchiver; (5) Stephen M. Slotchiver, Guardian ad Litem for [REDACTED] (6) David B. Bell and Matt Bodman, counsel for Terry Brown, Forlando Brown, and Romunzo Brown; (7) C. Havird Jones, Jr., J.C. Nicholson, III, and Mary Frances Jowers, on behalf of the South Carolina Attorney General; (8) R. Wayne Byrd, counsel for Albert Dallas and Alfred Bradley; (9) James M. Griffin, counsel for LaRhonda Petitt and Cinnamon Paris; (10) Fred L. Kingsmore, Jr., counsel for Russell Bauknight; (11) Jan L. Warner and Max Pickelsimer, counsel for David Cannon; (12) William Barr, counsel for Jeanette Mitchell; (13) Sonja R. Tate, counsel for Albert Dallas; and (14) Kaymani D. West, counsel for Greenberg Traurig and Joel Katz.

I. Statement and History of the Case

A. Facts and Procedural History

This matter arises out of the Estate of James Joseph Brown, Jr. Mr. Brown died on December 25, 2006, a resident of Aiken County, South Carolina. Mr. Brown's will, dated August 1, 2000, was filed with the Aiken County Probate Court on January 18, 2007. His will

nominated three individuals as Personal Representatives, and they were appointed by the Probate Court by Order dated January 18, 2007: Albert H. Dallas, David G. Cannon, and Alfred A. Bradley. These same individuals were appointed Trustees of the Trust by the express terms of the Trust.

Mr. Brown's will named six children: Deanna J. Brown Thomas, Yamma N. Brown, Vanisha Brown, Daryl J. Brown, Larry Brown, and Terry Brown (collectively "named children"). Mr. Brown left "all [his] personal and household effects of every kind . . ." to these named children in equal shares per stirpes. All of the named children were alive at the time of Mr. Brown's death. Mr. Brown left the remainder of his Estate to the Trust created under his Irrevocable Trust Agreement dated August 1, 2000. The will provided that the remainder of his Estate would go to the Trust as a pour-over devise.

Mr. Brown's Irrevocable Trust Agreement created two trusts: the Brown Family Educational Trust and the James Brown "I Feel Good" Trust. The Brown Family Educational Trust provides for income to be paid for the benefit of each then-living grandchild who has not reached the age of thirty-five (35) for his education and related expenses. Upon termination of the Family Trust, the balance would be added to the "I Feel Good" Trust. The "I Feel Good" Trust is for the "tuition, educational expenses, and financial assistance of and for poor and financially needy children, youth, or young adults (Who are both qualified and deserving) who seek and have need of such assistance to obtain and further their education at the many educational entities and/or institutions in the State of South Carolina and Georgia." In addition to the three appointed Trustees, the Trust created an Advisory Board of three initial members. The Trust describes the powers of the Trustees, including the power to allocate up to 50% of the gross income from the Trust for the payment of administrative and managerial expenses. The

Trust provides for Trustee Succession. If the Trustee resigns, the Trust provides that he appoint a successor, or upon failure of that, the successor shall be determined by unanimous vote of the advisory board then existing. Failing this, the Court having jurisdiction shall select the successor Trustee. The Trust included a Schedule A listing initial funding of the following: (1) Fifty Dollars (\$50.00); (2) all ownership in James Brown Enterprises, Inc.; and (3) ownership of Mr. Brown's primary residence at 430 Douglas Drive, Beech Island, South Carolina.

Mr. Brown's will was admitted to informal probate on January 18, 2007. On January 26, 2007, the Aiken County Probate Court removed the matter to the Court of Common Pleas. From this time forward, the Aiken County Probate Court continued to remove all matters filed in this Estate to the Court of Common Pleas.

On February 1, 2007, Tommie Rae Hynie Brown filed a Petition for Elective Share or Omitted Spouse's Share, asserting she is the widow of Mr. Brown. She and Mr. Brown were married on December 14, 2001, in Beech Island. She had previously been involved in a putative marriage ceremony with Javed Ahmed on February 17, 1997, in Texas. Mrs. Brown subsequently brought an action to annul her marriage to Ahmed, and the Charleston County Family Court found her marriage to Ahmed void *ab initio* by Order dated April 15, 2004. Among other conclusions, the Court found that Mr. Ahmed was married at the time he entered into his marriage with Mrs. Brown, and therefore he lacked capacity to marry her.

The six named children filed an Emergency Petition for Termination of Appointment of and Removal of Personal Representatives on January 24, 2007. On February 1, 2007, Tommie Ray Hynie Brown filed an Emergency Petition for Appointment of Special Administrator. The Court held a hearing on these Petitions on February 9, 2007. By Order dated February 20, 2007, the Court denied the Petition for Removal of the Personal Representatives and granted the

Petition for Special Administrator. By Order filed March 12, 2007, the Court appointed Adele J. Pope and Robert L. Buchanan, Jr., as Special Administrators. At that time, the Special Administrators' duties were limited and included the power to "monitor, investigate, and oversee the performance by the general Personal Representatives of their duties, and present to the Court any appropriate issues regarding same." By Order filed June 25, 2007, the Court granted the Special Administrators "complete, direct and continuing access to all information, documents and records, in any form, related to James Brown, the Estate of James Brown, the James Brown 2000 Irrevocable Trust and all trusts created thereunder, and all Brown Entities or Interest, however titled."

In addition to the six named children, several other individuals have appeared and claimed rights as children of Mr. Brown: (1) [REDACTED] (2) Cinnamon Nicole Parris; (3) LaRhonda Petit; and (4) Jeannette Mitchell. [REDACTED] seeks his rights as a pretermitted child, having been born on June 11, 2001, after Mr. Brown wrote his will. Steven Slotchiver was appointed Guardian ad Litem for [REDACTED] by Order filed June 13, 2007. [REDACTED] filed a Petition for Adjudication of Paternity on August 24, 2007. LaRhonda Petitt filed an action on August 23, 2007. Cinnamon Nicole Parris filed an action on September 21, 2007. Jeannette Mitchell filed a motion on April 21, 2008.

On July 27, 2007, the Special Administrators filed a Motion and Recommendation of Special Administrators requesting the Court to remove one or more of the Personal Representatives and one or more of the Trustees. A hearing was held on this Motion on August 10, 2007. At the hearing, David G. Cannon resigned as Personal Representative of the Estate, Trustee of the Brown Trusts, and as director, officer, agent, and/or fiduciary of any kind as to

DAE
#5

Mr. Brown, the Estate, the Brown Trusts, and all Brown Entities (except Seventh Decade Productions). Dallas and Bradley remained Personal Representatives and Trustees.

The Court held a hearing on September 24, 2007. At the hearing, the Court heard issues related to David Cannon's obligation to account to the Court. The Court found Cannon in contempt by Order filed October 2, 2007. A hearing to address whether Cannon's contempt was willful was held on November 15, 2007 and continued on November 20, 2007. By Order dated December 18, 2007, the Court found Cannon in willful contempt for failing to pay \$373,00.00 as ordered, and for amending tax returns on behalf of Brown entities after being ordered to give up authority in regard to the Brown entities and for deliberately disobeying the order of this Court. The Court ordered him to confinement with the South Carolina Department of Corrections for six months, though he could purge himself of the confinement by payment of the \$373,000.00, payment to the court of \$50,000.00 to be applied towards various parties' attorney fees, and a fine of \$10,000.00. Cannon appealed this Order, and as of the date of the present Order, the appeal is still pending.

The South Carolina Attorney General appeared at the hearing on September 24, 2007, and requested to intervene to enforce and protect the funds given or appropriated to any charitable trust created by the will or Trust of Mr. Brown, or any other assets of the Estate which may be impressed with a charitable trust. The Georgia Attorney General also appeared and requested to intervene. By Order filed October 11, 2007, the Court granted the Motions to Intervene. The South Carolina Attorney General continues to remain involved in the case. The Georgia Attorney General is no longer participating in the action, as discussed below.

At the hearing on November 20, 2007, Alfred Bradley and Albert Dallas submitted their resignation as Personal Representatives of the Estate and Trustees. By Order dated November

20, 2007, the Court accepted their resignations, and immediately appointed Buchanan and Pope to serve as Personal Representatives and Trustees. The Court did not consult the Advisory Board regarding their appointment. By Motion dated November 30, 2007, Dallas and Bradley moved the Court to vacate its Order accepting their resignations, arguing the Court did not have authority to accept the resignations or authority to appoint Pope and Buchanan as Trustees. The Court heard this matter on February 20, 2008, and denied Dallas and Bradley's Motion by Order filed March 7, 2008. Dallas and Bradley appealed, and as of the date of the present Order, the appeal is still pending.

On December 20, 2007, Tommie Rae Brown filed Petitions to Set Aside the Will and Trust, alleging causes of action for undue influence, fraud, lack of intent, and illusory trust. On December 26, 2007, five of the six named children (all but Terry Brown)¹ filed Petitions to Set Aside the Will and Trust, alleging the same four causes of action.

On January 4, 2008, the Court held a hearing on the Motion for Recusal filed by Dallas and Bradley. By Order filed February 20, 2008, the Court denied this Motion.

The Court held a hearing on February 7, 2008. At that hearing, the Court granted the motion of the Levenson clients to revoke the pro hac vice admission of the Georgia Attorney General, though no written Order has been issued on this matter. The Georgia Attorney General became involved in this matter based on an understanding of the Trust that only students in South Carolina and Georgia qualify for benefits under the "I Feel Good" Trust. However, a careful reading revealed that students can be from anywhere; the only limitation is that they desire to attend a school in South Carolina or Georgia. The Court found that the South Carolina

¹ The six named children, and their children who are Mr. Brown's grandchildren, were all originally represented by Louis Levenson. David Bell was substituted as counsel for Terry Brown, Forlando Brown, and Romunzo Brown.

Attorney General was the appropriate party to adequately protect the interests of the charitable beneficiaries because the trust situs is in South Carolina.

Also arising out of the hearing on February 7, 2008, the Court issued an Order filed February 25, 2008, allowing the PR/Trustees to sell Mr. Brown's tangible personal property and his home in Beech Island. The PR/Trustees desired to sell the personal property through an auction, and hired Christie's Auction House to conduct the sale. Over objection by other counsel, the Court allowed the sale of personal property.

The Court held a hearing on March 7, 2008. At the hearing, the Court heard arguments on the Attorney General's Objection to the Appointment of Pope and Buchanan as Personal Representatives and Trustees, filed December 14, 2007. The Court heard testimony from Pope, Dallas, and Bradley in connection with the Objection. The Court overruled the objection by Order filed April 10, 2008. The Attorney General filed a Motion to Alter or Amend this Order on April 24, 2008, and subsequently, by Motion dated June 18, 2008, asked the Court to hold the Motion to Alter or Amend in abeyance. This request was based on the fact that the Motion relates to the appointment of successor Trustees, and the pending appeal of Dallas and Bradley also relates to the appointment of Trustees and its outcome may make the Motion moot. Because of the request to hold the matter in abeyance, the Court has not ruled on the Motion to Reconsider.

By Order filed March 10, 2008, the Court required service by publication of the Summons and Order in the case caption 07-CP-02-1222. The Notice was published in the Aiken Standard on April 19 and 26, 2008, and May 3, 2008. The published notice stated that it was "to determine all lawful heirs of James Brown, including lawful heirs at law who may be entitled to

DAE
#8

rights under state and federal laws.” No additional parties have appeared as a result of the publication.

On August 10, 2008, the following parties participated in an informal mediation: Tommie Raye Hynie Brown; the named children and grandchildren represented by Louis Levenson; and the South Carolina Attorney General. The parties reached a settlement which was reduced to writing and signed by all of the participating parties.

At the hearing on August 19, 2008, the parties reported the partial settlement to the Court during an in-chambers conference. The parties also reported in open court that they had reached a resolution among themselves. At that time, the parties did not disclose their signed settlement document.

On September 29, 2008, the South Carolina Attorney General filed a Petition for Removal and Restraint of Trustees, asking that Dallas and Bradley be removed as Trustees, in the event they are Trustees. On November 7, 2008, the Attorney General and the other settling parties filed an Amended Petition for Removal and Restraint of Trustees Dallas, Bradley, and Cannon, and PR/Trustees Pope and Buchanan. The Court has not heard this matter pending the settlement approval. Also on November 7, 2008, the settling parties filed an Emergency Petition for Appointment of Special Administrator and Special Trustee.

During the pending settlement, Pope and Buchanan have filed numerous pleadings in the matter, including the following which were filed in addition to their Responses and Returns to other matters: (1) Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, dated September 12, 2008; (2) Supplemental Motion to Dismiss All “Spousal” Claims of Tommie Rae Hynie Brown, dated September 12, 2008; (3) Motion to Dismiss all Causes of Action to Set Aside the James Brown 2000 Irrevocable Trust, dated September 15, 2008; (4) Motion to Dismiss, dated October 9,

2008; (5) Motion to Intervene and Dismiss, dated October 24, 2008; (6) Motion to Dismiss Robert L. Buchanan, Jr. and Adele J. Pope as Individual Parties, dated November 14, 2008; (7) Motion to Disqualify C. Havird Jones, Jr. and Mary Frances Jowers as Counsel and Related Relief, dated November 14, 2008; (8) Emergency Motion to Quash Subpoena and Protect Evidence, dated November 14, 2008; (9) Motion to Realign, for Partial Summary Judgment and for Mediation after Proper Joinder of Parties and Discovery, dated January 9, 2009; (10) Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, dated January 14, 2009; (11) Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, dated January 20, 2009; (12) Motion and Memorandum of PR/Trustees for Partial Summary Judgment that the AG and PR/Trustees have a Duty to Defend and Uphold the James Brown 2000 Irrevocable Trust; the Trust and Transfer to the Irrevocable Trust of Beech Island are Valid; and all Challenges to the Irrevocable Trust and the Deed of Beech Island to the Trust are Barred by Statutes of Limitation and Estoppel; and Petition for Mandatory Guidance under section 62-7-932(D), dated February 23, 2009; (13) Emergency Motion for Appointment of Special Administrator and Special Trustee, dated February 27, 2009; (14) Motion to Reconsider, Vacate, Set Aside, Alter and/or Amend and/or Clarify Orders, dated March 12, 2009; and (15) Supplemental Motion of PR/Trustees to Dismiss (where applicable), and for Partial Summary Judgment, dated March 17, 2009.

In addition, they also filed numerous affidavits after the settlement was announced to the Court, including the following; (1) Joint Affidavit of Robert L. Buchanan, Jr., and Adele J. Pope Supporting Demand for Due Process Hearing and Related Relief, dated November 24, 2008; (2) Joint Affidavit of Robert L. Buchanan, Jr. and Adele J. Pope, dated January 20, 2009; (3) Affidavit of Robert L. Buchanan, Jr. and Adele J. Pope in Support of Injunction and Damages for Intentional Interference, dated February 17, 2009; (4) Joint Affidavit of Robert L. Buchanan, Jr.

DRE
#10

and Adele J. Pope, dated February 19, 2009; (5) Affidavit of Adele J. Pope Opposing Removal of PR/Trustees Buchanan & Pope; Denying Emergency; Supporting Stay and Proper Joinder Supporting Proper Notice of Hearings; Supporting Order Compelling parties to Appeal with records to Testify; and Seeking Ruling Under S.C. Trust Code section 62-7-932(D) Related to Principal and Income Charges Under Will/Trust *In Terrorem* Clauses, dated February 23, 2009; and (6) Affidavit of Robert L. Buchanan, Jr. and Adele J. Pope as PR/Trustees Supporting Emergency Motion for Appointment of Special Administrator and Special Trustee with Full Authority to Manage, Preserve and Protect Assets of the Estate of James Brown, the James Brown 2000 Trust, James Brown Enterprises, Inc. and other Brown Entities pending final resolution of all formal testacy/resignation/removal/appointment matters and challenges to the validity of the James Brown 2000 Trust.

The Court held a hearing on November 25, 2008, and at that time the settling parties disclosed the terms of the settlement on the record and reported they were ready to move forward with a hearing to approve the settlement. The Court scheduled a hearing for settlement approval on January 30, 2009. The Court continued to conduct that hearing on March 4, 5, 6, 25, and 26, 2009, and concluded the hearing on April 6, 2009.

By Order filed January 7, 2009, the Court appointed Russell L. Bauknight as Special Administrator and Special Trustee for the "sole limited and exclusive purpose of reviewing and providing input and recommendations to the Court as to the proposed Settlement Agreement among the Petitioners in this case." Ms. Pope and Messrs. Buchanan, Dallas, and Bradley appealed the Court's January 7, 2009 order to the Court of Appeals. The appeals were dismissed.

At the hearing on January 30, 2009, the settling parties reported that Terry Brown had joined the settlement. Thus, all beneficiaries of the Brown Estate/Trust were part of the

settlement agreement. The settlement agreement does not include Cinnamon Parris, LaRhonda Petitt, or Jeannette Mitchell. However, those parties each stated they have no objection to the settlement, pursuant to a stipulation with the settling parties that the settling parties do not intend for the settlement to in any way impact or affect their rights.

B. Related Litigation

While the above actions have been pending, there are numerous collateral matters pending in other jurisdictions. [REDACTED] sued Pope and Buchanan in South Carolina District Court on January 2, 2008. As a grandchild and beneficiary of the Family Educational Trust, [REDACTED] contends in the action that he has not received the scholarship money he is entitled to. His allegations against Pope and Buchanan include the following: (1) that they have irreconcilable conflicts of interest; (2) that they have breached their fiduciary duties; and (3) that they have disregarded the terms of the Trust. He seeks removal of Pope and Buchanan and injunctive relief. This action remains pending in the district court.

The CORBIS litigation is pending in Illinois. This action involves claims brought by Mr. Brown during his life for violation of rights of publicity, violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, and a claim for profiteering on the name and likeness of Mr. Brown without his consent based on CORBIS' sale and offering for sale over the internet of Mr. Brown's photographs for commercial purposes. There is a pending settlement in the CORBIS litigation, and on March 24, 2008, Buchanan and Pope brought an action against the South Carolina Attorney General in Aiken County, asking the Court to approve the terms of the CORBIS settlement agreement.

The Pullman litigation is pending in New York. During his life, Mr. Brown sued the Pullman Group when he was unable to secure a loan from the Royal Bank of Scotland using

future song royalties as collateral because Pullman Group claimed it had exclusive authority to broker the transaction. The Pullman Group filed a counterclaim, and this action remains pending against the Estate.

On April 6, 2009, Jacqueline Hollander filed an action in the Northern District of Illinois against Pope, Buchanan, and the State of South Carolina. She seeks a finding that she and Mr. Brown were partners and the "I Feel Good" Trust was an extension of the partnership, which she owns as the surviving partner.

C. Synopsis of Settlement Agreement

The settlement agreement dated August 10, 2008, and amended and restated on March 3, 2009, was entered into by and among Henry D. McMaster, Attorney General of South Carolina (the "Attorney General"), Tommie Rae Brown, individually and on behalf of her minor child, [REDACTED] Larry Brown, individually and on behalf of his minor child [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Venisha Brown, Deanna J. Brown, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Yamma N. Brown, individually and on behalf of her minor children, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Daryl J. Brown, and Tonya Brown, and Terry Brown (the "Settling Parties"). The salient points of the settlement agreement are as follows:

1. The purpose of the agreement was to settle any and all differences among the settling parties concerning the disposition, whether by will or otherwise, and/or transfer of any assets owned or controlled by James Brown, whether by will, intestacy, trust, or nonprobate means, state or federal law, and of substantial significance, to come together as a family to honor the legacy of Mr. Brown.
2. The settling parties intend for the agreement to be a binding private settlement agreement but also are seeking court approval of the settlement.

3. Tommie Rae was the legal wife of James Brown, during his lifetime and at the time of his death, and qualifies as his surviving spouse.

4. The children and grandchildren who are parties to the agreement were and are the lawful and/or legitimate biological issue and heirs of James Brown during his lifetime and were in life and at the time of his death, and qualify as his surviving issue. No DNA testing will be required of any child or grandchild who is a party to the agreement.

5. A professional fiduciary will replace Robert Buchanan and Adele Pope as Personal Representatives of the Estate of James Brown and as Trustees of the August 1, 2000 Irrevocable Trust of James Brown.

6. A charitable trust substantially similar to the August 1, 2000 Irrevocable Trust (hereinafter the "Charitable Trust") shall be created and/or maintained and shall be valid and enforceable. The South Carolina Attorney General will have sole authority to select, remove, and replace the Trustee who will manage the Charitable Trust. The children and Tommie Rae shall each be empowered to select a trustee from whom the managing trustee will seek input and advice.

7. The settling parties will create an entity (the "settlement entity") that will receive any and all assets and or proceeds payable to any of the parties, now or in the future, by virtue of any rights of James Brown, any of the entities of James Brown, the Estate of James Brown, the August 1, 2000 James Brown Irrevocable Trust and the charitable trust created thereunder, in any probate or non-probate assets, tangible and intangible, included in the gross estate of James Brown, as well as any and all rights and interests in any assets outside of the gross estate of James Brown, and/or any rights the parties have as heirs, devisees, and/or successors to James Brown for any purpose, including, but not limited to, any royalties, trademarks, termination

rights and other interests created by federal copyright statute or laws for heirs at law, the Beech Island real estate, all of the James Brown intellectual property rights to royalty, persona, image, likeness, royalties etc. (collectively, the "James Brown Assets"). The parties will divide any and all such assets and/or proceeds, and maintain beneficial ownership interests in the settlement entity, in the following proportions for as long as such assets and proceeds are paid into said entity or any successor entity thereto: (1) a net 47.5% to the Charitable Trust; (2) a net 23.75% to Tommie Rae, which includes any share attributable to [REDACTED] (by agreement between Tommie Rae and the Guardian ad Litem for [REDACTED] he will receive a 4.79% interest in the settlement entity to be held in trust and the remainder interest in another 4.79% interest in the settlement entity to be held in trust); and (3) a net 4.79% interest in the settlement entity to each of the children who are settling parties (with the exception of James Joseph Brown, II, who is provided for as discussed above). The Charitable Trust retains a 50% voting and control interest in the Settlement Entity, and the named children and Tommie Rae Brown (including any share attributable to [REDACTED]) shall each retain a 25% voting and control interest. Tommie Rae waives any spousal right she may have to such assets to the extent that they might otherwise exceed her interest in the settlement entity. The children waive any rights to the Brown Assets to the extent that they might otherwise exceed their interests in the settlement entity.

8. All settling parties waive any claim or right to seek forfeiture against any party pursuant to any in terrorem and/or no-contest clause under any will or trust of James Brown, and specifically agree that any and all contests that were brought were in good faith and with probable cause.

DAE
#15

9. The promissory note and security deed currently due from the parties represented by Levenson to the Estate of James Brown (with respect to the property known as Pops house, which is the home of the father of James Brown) will be marked satisfied and paid in full by the settlement entity for no additional payment being due.

10. Terry Brown will receive an exclusive due diligence period of six months during which he can market the assets of the Estate and a Right of First Refusal that terminates in 10 years. However, the settling parties do not have to agree to sell any or all of the assets and a 2/3 majority is required to do so.

11. A trust similar to the Brown Educational Trust under the 2000 Irrevocable Trust will be established for the grandchildren of James Brown, and their issue, for as long as allowed under the applicable Rule Against Perpetuities, but in no event lasting for a period longer than 90 years from December 25, 2006. This Brown family educational trust shall be funded with a principal amount of \$2 million, which shall be carved out from the share of assets and proceeds payable to the Charitable Trust. Upon the termination of this Brown family educational trust, the remaining principal and any undistributed income shall be distributed to the Charitable Trust.

12. Any and all will and trust contests will be dismissed.

13. The parties agree that the settlement entity and/or the parties will endeavor to create an appropriate and respectful museum or other memorial burial place acceptable to the settlement entity in which to maintain the remains of James Brown, preferably at 430 Douglas Drive, Beech Island, if feasible. If such is not accomplished within 7 years from the date of the agreement, then in that event the remains will be interred in the cemetery where the parents of James Brown currently are located in Augusta, GA, with the settlement entity paying expenses of relocation. The settling parties shall all have reasonable opportunities to visit privately the

gravesite upon reasonable notice. The parties waived any right to otherwise direct the location of the gravesite as a result of their status under law.

II. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

A. Parties, Notice, and Jurisdiction

For several reasons, I find that the interested parties have been properly notified, given an opportunity to be heard, afforded all appropriate due process rights, and thus appropriately represented at the hearing to approve the settlement. Ms. Pope and Mr. Buchanan claim a lack of notice. The notice for the hearing commenced on January 30, 2009, was provided on December 5, 2008, in advance of the time required under any applicable rule. The Court commenced the hearing on January 30, 2009, and continued to conduct that hearing on March 4, 5, 6, 25, and 26, 2009, and concluded the hearing on April 6, 2009. Because these dates involved the conduct of the same hearing commenced on January 30, 2009, notice was proper.

1. The settling parties' agreement does not impact rights other than their own. Thus, assuming arguendo that there were interested persons in the Estate of James Brown who were not properly notified and given an opportunity to be heard (although there are none), their lack of participation in the hearing, assumed for the sake of argument, would not affect the ability of this Court to approve the settlement.

South Carolina Probate Code (SCPC) section 62-3-912 recognizes that parties may enter into a private settlement agreement without court approval. The agreement may be among fewer than all persons interested in an estate. Moreover, that section requires personal representatives to honor the terms of the private settlement and to continue the administration of the estate for the benefit of those who are not parties to the settlement. By requiring the personal representatives to both honor the settlement and to continue administering the estate for those

successors who are not parties to the agreement, section 62-3-912 evidences the legislative intent to recognize as valid settlements among some but not all of the successors to an estate. Moreover, the parties to the settlement agreement are all successors to the Estate. SCPC section 62-1-201(42) broadly defines "successors" to include "those persons, other than creditors, who are entitled to property of a decedent under his will or this Code." The charitable successors are properly represented by the Attorney General of South Carolina, as discussed below.

SCPC sections 62-3-1101 and 62-3-1102, authorizing a court to approve a settlement agreement, also recognize the validity of a settlement by fewer than all parties. Section 62-3-1102 requires that the settlement be signed by all competent persons whose beneficial interests or claims will or may be affected by the settlement. As with section 62-3-912 discussed above, section 62-3-1102 thus recognizes that a settlement agreement may be effectuated by fewer than all the interested persons in an estate; only those whose interests will or may be affected by the settlement must be signatories.

Section 62-3-1102 also provides that fiduciaries have an opportunity to be heard at a settlement approval hearing but do not have the authority to veto a settlement presented to the court for approval. Although section 62-3-1102 recognizes that a fiduciary may be a party to a settlement and even propose its approval to the court,² it provides that a fiduciary who is not a

² The ability of a fiduciary to agree to be a party to a settlement is recognized in *University of Southern California v. Moran*, 365 S.C. 270, 617 S.E.2d 135, (Ct. App. 2005), providing that when a trustee joins in the execution of a settlement agreement, a trust beneficiary, although given the opportunity to notice and to be heard, cannot veto the settlement. *Moran* does not apply to the matter *sub judice*, which deals with a different situation: the fiduciary did not join in the execution of this settlement agreement. In the case *sub judice*, section 62-3-1102 clearly provides that, because the fiduciaries did not join in the settlement agreement, this Court can nevertheless approve the settlement and direct the fiduciaries to join in the execution of the approved agreement.

party to the settlement can be directed by the court to execute the agreement after it is approved by the court.

2. Even though fewer than all interested persons can enter into a private settlement agreement and a court can approve such an agreement, all necessary parties are represented in this matter.

The SCPC provides that personal representatives and trustees represent and bind their beneficiaries for purpose of notice and hearing. See SCPC sections 62-1-403, 62-7-301, and 62-7-303.

Ms. Pope and Mr. Buchanan, the personal representatives of the Estate, were appointed to represent any successor of the Estate, whether by any valid will of Mr. Brown or by intestate distribution. Thus, any successor who would take from the probate estate of Mr. Brown would be properly represented by Ms. Pope and Mr. Buchanan, who do not have a conflict of interest with any of the successors.

Similarly, any beneficiaries of the 2000 Irrevocable Trust, if valid, would be represented by Ms. Pope and Mr. Buchanan as trustees of that trust. Any beneficiaries of the 1999 Revocable Trust, if valid, would be represented by Messrs. Bradley, Cannon, and Dallas as trustees of that trust who participated in the settlement hearing.

There can be no other successor or beneficiary with an interest in the Estate of James Brown or in the 2000 Irrevocable Trust or the 1999 Revocable Trust. Any successor or beneficiary of the Estate or those trusts were represented by the appropriate fiduciaries. Moreover, minor children of the settling parties were also properly represented by their parents

DAE
#19

who executed the agreement, and any charitable beneficiaries of the Estate and trusts were also properly represented by the South Carolina Attorney General.³

3. In addition to the notice and opportunity to be heard afforded by the representation discussed above, I find that any interested person also received notice and an opportunity to be heard pursuant to the publication of notice directed by order of this Court filed on March 10, 2008, as discussed above.

4. It is clear that the Attorney General in his *parens patriae* capacity has the authority to protect the public interest and to enforce the due application of those funds given or appropriated to any charitable trust, and the Attorney General is the proper party to protect the interests of the public at large in the matter of administering or enforcing charitable trusts. See *South Carolina Dep't of Mental Health v. McMaster, et al.*, 372 S.C. 175, 642 S.E.2d 52 (2007) (Attorney General is charged with the protection of public charities and is required to enforce the due application of fund given or appropriated to such charities); *Epworth Children's Home v. W. F. Beasley, et al.*, 365 S.C. 157, 616 S.E.2d 710 (2005); and *Furman Univ. v. McLeod*, 238 S.C. 475, 482, 120 S.E.2d 865, 868 (1961); also see S.C. Code Ann. §1-7-130 and S.C. Code Ann. § 62-7-405(c).

³ Ms. Pope and Mr. Buchanan contend that notice and hearing opportunities should have been afforded Salkehatchie, Voorhees, and USC Aiken as beneficiaries of the 1999 Revocable Trust and to the members of the advisory board they attempted to appoint in their capacities as trustees. If these parties were interested, they were represented as discussed above. However, none of these three institutions of higher learning nor the advisory board members are interested persons. The colleges are not the beneficiaries of any trust; as noted by Mr. Buchanan in his testimony, it is the students who would attend those schools who are the beneficiaries, and they are already represented as discussed above. (If those three colleges would have to be parties to any action involving the 1999 trust, then by extension every educational institution in South Carolina and Georgia would have to be parties to any action involving the 2000 trust.) The advisory board members have no beneficial interest in the trust.

DAE
#26

It is noted that section 62-7-405(c) also allows the settlor, trustee, and among others [i.e. parties with "special interests"] to enforce a charitable trust. The general law is that the purpose for providing authority pursuant to statute to allow other parties to bring an action to enforce charitable trusts was to provide assistance to the Attorney General because of that Office's lack of resources to be in all charitable trust cases. See Bogert *Trusts and Trustees* § 411 - "The attorney general as the protector, supervisor and enforcer of charitable trusts." However, when the Attorney General does appear in litigation involving a charitable trust either by motion for intervention or being brought in by an amendment to the pleadings, he has the right to take charge and control that portion of the litigation which relates to the charitable trust. *Kolin, et al. v. Leitch, et al.*, 99 N.E.2d 685, 687 (Ill. 1951). As previously stated, the South Carolina Attorney General's Motion to Intervene in this matter was granted by Order filed October 11, 2007.

This authority that allows the Attorney General to control the litigation also provides that the Attorney General has exclusive authority, in order to protect the public interest, to settle or compromise litigation.⁴ See *Sarkeys v. Independent School Dist.*, 592 P.2d 529 (Okla. 1979).

In *Sarkeys*, the Court approved a settlement involving a charitable trust entered into by the parties and the Attorney General. Settlor's descendants appealed. The Court found that they did not have standing to appeal in the absence of an appeal by the Attorney General because the Attorney General was in control of the case. Similarly in *Application of Schlusser*, 89 N.Y.S.2d

⁴ See 81 A.L.R. 124 (with updates, originally published in 1932), citing *Cooley v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n*, 204 S.C. 10, 28 S.E.2d 445 (1943) and *State v. Southern R. Co.*, 82 S.C. 12, 62 S.E.2d 116 (1908), at page 7: The general authority of the attorney general, at common law under the various constitutional and statutory provisions, to compromise or settle disputes in litigation in which the state is an interested party, and to direct dismissal of the proceedings, so far at least as the public interest is concerned, provided there is doubt and an honest dispute as to the state's rights and the compromise or settlement is a bona fide one, is well settled.

47 (1949), the Court stated as follows in regards to the Attorney General's authority to enter a settlement agreement: "Under the authorities, it is, therefore, within the competence of the Attorney General to bind the uncertain charitable beneficiaries by [a compromise]." Also see *In Re Estate of Smith*, 349 N.Y.S.2d 281 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1973), appeal dismissed, 355 N.Y.S.2d 994 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974), appeal denied, 321 N.E.2d 555 (N.Y.) (allowing Attorney General to enter into settlement agreement on behalf of charitable beneficiaries and over executor's objection; rejecting executor's contention that Attorney General did not have authority to compromise on behalf of charitable beneficiaries; observing that to delve too deeply into Attorney General's reasons to compromise could jeopardize charitable beneficiaries' ultimate case if not settled; nevertheless finding that the Attorney General had sufficient reason to enter settlement and was not making "gift"; noting that failure to settle risked charities ending up with nothing; observing that settlement of cases is desirable; holding that the Attorney General has the right and the power to enter into compromise on behalf of charitable beneficiaries, subject only to an abuse of discretion standard, which was not abused in this case.).

Therefore it is for the Attorney General, as the officer charged with the duty of protecting charitable beneficiaries, to exercise his discretion as to the appropriateness of a settlement. It is the responsibility of this Court in reviewing the record to determine if the Attorney General acted in good faith entering into this compromise agreement. Factors to be considered by the Court include whether the Attorney General has given careful consideration to his decision with relation to the compromise and whether the Attorney General's decision is based upon solid legal judgment and a full consideration of all the facts and circumstances available. It would be appropriate for the Attorney General to include in his review whether there was a possibility that the final outcome of this litigation was in doubt and the continued expense to the charitable trust

by additional litigation. See *In Re Estate of Smith*, supra at 283-4. These factors for my consideration are subsumed in the requirements of section 62-3-1102 that the settlement be in good faith and that it is just and reasonable. Therefore I find that the Attorney General has the power pursuant to his common law and statutory authority to protect the charitable beneficiaries, to control such litigation as to the charitable interests when he is a party, and to compromise and settle such interests where appropriate.

B. Standard for Approving Settlement

South Carolina Probate Code section 62-3-1102 provides that the Court shall approve the settlement and direct the fiduciaries to execute the agreement if it: (1) finds the contest or controversy is in good faith, and (2) the effect of the agreement on interested persons is just and reasonable.

1. Good faith controversy

Based on the history of matters involving the Estate and other issues related to James Brown, I find that it is incontrovertible that a good faith controversy exists. Any of the factors discussed hereinafter could constitute grounds for finding that a good faith controversy exists. The cumulation of these issues creates an overwhelming set of grounds for finding that a good faith controversy exists. Some of the more salient issues are as follows:

a. The Levenson clients and Tommie Rae Brown brought actions to contest the 2000 Will and the 2000 Irrevocable Trust. Although the contestants raised other reasons for the contest, a compelling argument was that Cannon, Dallas, and Bradley unduly influenced Mr. Brown into executing those documents. Without deciding whether the undue influence argument has merit, I find that argument certainly has a foundation in good faith. The 2000 Trust names Cannon, Dallas, and Bradley as trustees. The 2000 trust authorizes the trustees to expend up to

50% of gross income for management expenses.⁵ Based on testimony from Ms. Pope and Mr. Ruff, the estate planning expert presented by Ms. Pope and Mr. Buchanan, such a provision is unprecedented, especially in a charitable trust. On behalf of the estate and trust, Ms. Pope and Mr. Buchanan have brought an action against Messrs. Cannon, Dallas, and Bradley, alleging inter alia that Messrs. Cannon, Dallas, and Bradley practiced undue influence on Mr. Brown and used various entities controlled by them to syphon off his assets, effectively under the guise of management expenses. Ms. Pope testified that Mr. Cannon told her he could get half of Mr. Brown's estate, if he wanted.

Moreover, the voluminous file of the drafter of the 2000 will and trust (and of the 1999 will and trust), Mr. Herring, is in evidence. That file contains a blank deed apparently signed by Mr. Brown and witnessed. There is no valid reason to create such a document, and its existence certainly adds additional credence to the argument against the validity of any document prepared for Mr. Brown by Mr. Herring. Upon questioning, Mr. Buchanan could testify to the existence of only one document that may be in that voluminous file that possibly represents direct correspondence between Mr. Herring and Mr. Brown. There is evidence in the file that Mr. Herring and Mr. Cannon are good friends.

Furthermore, the credibility of four principal witnesses to the validity of the 2000 will and trust is questionable. Mr. Herring is in jail for murder. The accuracy and veracity of the testimony in this matter by Messrs. Cannon, Dallas, and Bradley is suspect and at times

⁵ Whether the 50% provision would be valid, in light of the charitable savings clause language in the trust, is irrelevant to the issue of undue influence. The issue is whether the alleged practitioners of undue influence believed at the time of preparation and execution of the 2000 will and trust that the 50% provision would be enforceable. Assuming they did, otherwise why would a known invalid provision be included, that could be evidence of undue influence.

contradictory. For example, Mr. Dallas testified that he signed a stipulation presented to this Court knowing it to be false because he did not want to lose his position as fiduciary. This is an astonishing admission that he did and would lie to this Court to protect his position as a fiduciary. The questionable credibility of the four witnesses most involved with the preparation and execution of the 2000 will and trust certainly supports the good faith basis of the contestants' claims.

If the 2000 will and trust were found to be invalid for undue influence, and the issue of whether the 1999 will and trust were valid was then raised, the same arguments as above could be asserted against the validity of the 1999 will and trust, and that controversy would also be in good faith.

In her testimony, Ms. Pope asserted that the case of *Russell v. Wachovia Bank, N.A.*,⁶ was controlling. That case is not controlling. The issue before this Court is whether the proposed settlement agreement is the result of a good faith controversy and whether the agreement is just and reasonable. There was no settlement agreement in *Russell*. The gist of the *Russell* case was whether a federal appellate court judge still sitting on cases until a few weeks before his death was the victim of undue influence practiced by family members. The circumstances of Mr. Brown's execution of the 2000 will and trust documents are not the same as in the *Russell* case.

b. In addition to the controversy over the validity of any will and trust executed by Mr. Brown, a good faith controversy exists over what property if any was funded into the 2000 trust and what property if any would pass through the probate estate pursuant to the 2000 will.

⁶ 370 S.C. 5, 633 S.E.2d 722 (2006); 353 S.C. 208, 578 S.E.2d 329 (2003).

Testimony demonstrates that records that would adequately prove the provenance of any trust or probate assets are either non-existent or too scanty to provide adequate proof. Moreover, testimony from the three original trustees is contradictory. They executed a stipulation representing that the only assets of the 2000 trust were the Beech Island real estate and 50 dollars. Subsequently, Mr. Dallas testified that the stipulation was incorrect and that he had joined in the stipulation to avoid losing his position as fiduciary. The fiduciaries ultimately sought to withdraw the stipulation.

More specifically, questions remain as to whether James Brown Enterprises, Inc. ("JBE, Inc.") was transferred to the trust during Mr. Brown's lifetime. Available documentation shows that any attempted transfer was incomplete. Furthermore, income tax returns filed on behalf of JBE, Inc. showed Mr. Brown, not the 2000 trust, as the owner. Nevertheless, the ownership of JBE., Inc is uncertain. Even if the ownership of JBE., Inc. could be confirmed, determining what assets if any JBE, Inc. owns is also problematic due to a dearth of documentation.

The ownership of the relevant assets as between the estate and the trust could affect the assets subject to the spousal share claims of Tommie Rae Brown, as discussed below, as well as the omitted child share claim of [REDACTED] as discussed below.

Any assets that would pass pursuant to the 2000 will would be subject to spousal share claims and omitted child claims. Also, a good faith argument exists for subjecting any assets of the 2000 trust to the elective share, pursuant to the *Seifert* and *Dreher* decisions,⁷ and by analogy, to the omitted spouse and omitted child shares. Because testimony demonstrated that Mr. Brown retained control of the 2000 trust, it could be deemed a revocable trust, which would

⁷ *Seifert v. Southern Nat. Bank of South Carolina*, 305 S.C. 353, 409 S.E.2d 337 (1991); *Dreher v. Dreher*, 370 S.C. 75, 634 S.E.2d 646 (2006).

be subject to the elective share and, by extension, to the omitted spouse share and omitted child share.

Moreover, certain assets, such as the copyright termination rights would not belong to the 2000 trust or to the probate estate, instead passing by federal law to the federal statutory heirs.

Further confusing the question of ownership is the question of the validity of the 1999 revocable trust. Mr. Dallas, one of the trustees of that trust, testified that he did not know if the 1999 trust had been revoked in accordance with its provisions. Nor was any evidence produced from Mr. Herring's file that the 1999 trust had been revoked. If that trust was valid and was not revoked, then ownership issues similar to the 2000 trust arise as to the 1999 trust. If the 1999 trust was valid and not revoked, then any assets owned by that trust might not be included in the 2000 trust or the probate estate. Furthermore, any assets owned by the 1999 revocable trust would clearly be subject to the elective share pursuant to *Seifert* and *Dreher* and, by analogy would be subject to the omitted spouse's share and the omitted child's share.

If the 1999 trust was valid, funded, and not revoked, then the trustees of the 2000 trust had no power or control over those assets.

c. A compelling factor in finding that a good faith controversy existed is the assertion of Tommie Rae Brown (Mrs. Brown) of elective share and omitted spouse's share claims. If Mrs. Brown qualifies as a surviving spouse, then she would clearly be entitled to an elective share and may well qualify for an omitted spouse's share. The elective share would be one-third of the probate assets plus any assets held by a revocable trust, pursuant to *Seifert* and *Dreher*. The omitted spouse's share would be one-half of the probate assets plus, by analogy to *Seifert* and *Dreher*, any assets held by a revocable trust. In addition, Mrs. Brown would have a

DAE
27

claim as a surviving spouse under federal copyright law to receive one-half of the copyright termination rights.

Asserting the *Lukich* decisions,⁸ the personal representatives and trustees have argued vigorously that Mrs. Brown does not qualify as a surviving spouse. They contended that she had an impediment to her marriage to Mr. Brown because she was already married at the time to Javed Ahmed. However, the evidence demonstrated that the Charleston County Family Court held as a finding of fact and a conclusion of law that Mrs. Brown had no impediment to her marriage to Mr. Brown because she was never previously married to Javed Ahmed as he had an impediment to that purported marriage: he was already married at the time. The family court order shows that Javed Ahmed was properly served by publication.

The *Lukich* decisions effectively held that an annulled marriage could not relate back to the time of the creation of the annulled marriage for purposes of removing an impediment to a subsequently attempted marriage. However, Mr. Buchanan admitted in his testimony that the *Lukich* decisions provided that its holding could not apply to a marriage that never had validity, as is the case with Mrs. Brown's putative marriage to Javed Ahmed, which according to the family court order was never valid because Javed Ahmed himself had an impediment to that putative marriage. Thus, rather than supporting the position of the personal representatives and trustees, *Lukich* supports the position of Mrs. Brown as Mr. Brown's surviving spouse.

Moreover, Mr. Buchanan also admitted in his testimony that *Lukich* held that a third party has no right to intervene in a marriage proceeding, such that Mr. Brown had no right to intervene in the proceeding brought by Mrs. Brown to determine that there was an impediment to her

⁸ 379 S.C. 589, 666 S.E.2d 906 (2008); 368 S.C. 47, 627 S.E.2d 754 (Ct. App. 2006).

marriage to Javed Ahmed. Rather, the evidence demonstrates that Mr. Brown paid Mrs. Brown's legal fees to bring that action.

The personal representatives and trustees assert that Mr. Brown brought his own annulment action against Mrs. Brown. The record shows that action was commenced after the commencement of the Javed Ahmed action. Mr. Brown and Mrs. Brown mutually consented to a dismissal of the annulment action brought by Mr. Brown. Although the personal representatives and trustees assert that the consent order of dismissal includes a waiver by Mrs. Brown to ever claim any status as a common-law spouse, that waiver, even if valid under the law, is immaterial to the matter *sub judice*. Mrs. Brown is not asserting her claim as a common-law spouse but rather as a surviving spouse based on her ceremonial marriage to Mr. Brown and their South Carolina marriage license and certificate.

The evidence also demonstrates that, in his authorized autobiography, Mr. Brown represented that he was married to Tommie Rae Brown. Significantly, his autobiography was copyrighted and first published in 2005, after the conclusion of both family court matters discussed above.

Thus, based on *Lukich*, Mr. Brown (or any third party) did not have the right to intervene or contest the family court order holding that there was an impediment to the purported marriage between Mrs. Brown and Javed Ahmed. If he did not have that right, neither do his fiduciaries. Thus, as to the estate and any trust, that family court order, as well as the marriage license, constitute the law of the case as to that issue.

In the settlement agreement, the settling parties agree that Mrs. Brown is the surviving spouse of Mr. Brown, presumably spurred on by the compelling factors discussed above. Treating Mrs. Brown as the surviving spouse provides substantial benefit to the settling parties,

including the charitable beneficiaries. Her status as surviving spouse allows the estate to claim a marital deduction for those assets passing to her, which increases the net amount passing to the settlement entity, in which the charitable beneficiaries have a share and thereby benefit from that tax savings.

d. Another factor evidencing the existence of a good faith controversy is the omitted child's claim submitted on behalf of [REDACTED] by his guardian ad litem. Pursuant to SCPC section 62-2-302, a child born after the execution of the testator's will is entitled to receive his intestate share if omitted from the will. The 2000 will was executed before the birth of [REDACTED]. Although the personal representatives contested that [REDACTED] was the biological child of Mr. Brown, substantial evidence would demonstrate that [REDACTED] is indeed the biological child of Mr. Brown. Mr. Brown's describes [REDACTED] as his son in his autobiography. Mr. Brown is listed as the father on the birth certificate. Mr. Brown obtained health insurance and social security benefits for [REDACTED] by representing that he was his son;⁹ he named him as his son in his medical directive. The guardian ad litem procured a DNA test demonstrating that there was a greater than 99 percent probability that they were father and biological son. [REDACTED] is presumed to be the child of the marriage of Mr. Brown and Mrs. Brown because that marriage was valid, as discussed above. Even though [REDACTED] was born before that marriage, the subsequent marriage of Mr. Brown and Mrs. Brown would legitimize [REDACTED] pursuant to SCPC section 62-2-109.¹⁰ Although [REDACTED] would not

⁹ Thus, to find that [REDACTED] was not the son of Mr. Brown opens the door for a claim that Mr. Brown defrauded the health insurance carrier and social security.

¹⁰ This would be true even if the marriage was not valid. SCPC section 62-109 legitimizes a child if his parents

need to be legitimate to qualify under section 62-2-302 for his intestate share, it is an additional factor to consider.

[REDACTED] is not automatically entitled to an omitted child's share merely because he is found to be Mr. Brown's son. One operative exception to the granting of the omitted child's share is if the testator specifically provides for overriding the statutory share. One might argue that language in Mr. Brown's 2000 will does specifically provide for such an override, but there is compelling authority to the contrary.¹¹ Ultimately, that issue would be decided by determining Mr. Brown's intent.

The settling parties agree that [REDACTED] is the biological child of Mr. Brown. Treating him as a child provides substantial benefit to the settling parties, including the charitable beneficiaries. His status as a child allows him to claim, for the benefit of the settlement entity, a federal copyright termination rights share. Moreover, treating [REDACTED] as the child of Mr. Brown does not detrimentally impact the settlement entity, including the charitable beneficiaries, because according to the settlement agreement his share is paid from Mrs. Brown's share.

e. Another factor indicating the existence of a good faith controversy involves the applicable time to contest the 2000 trust. Section 62-7-5 provides that a trust is voidable if it resulted from fraud, coercion, or undue influence — the gravamen of the contestant's actions to contest the trust. The fiduciaries contend that the statute of limitations to contest the 2000 trust

subsequently attempt to marry even in the attempted marriage is not valid.

¹¹ See, e.g., *Estate of Robbins*, 756 A.2d 602 (N.H. 2000); *Estate of Torregano*, 352 P.2d 505 (Cal. 1960). The estate would bear the burden of proof. *In re Estate of Hoigaard*, 360 N.W.2d 360 (Minn.App.1984).

has run. However, for the reasons discussed below, the contestants would have viable arguments that no statute of limitations would bar their contest.

i. As to fraud

Assuming arguendo that the 2000 trust is irrevocable, South Carolina follows the discovery rule for fraud, which commences the running of the statute of limitations from discovery of the fraud itself or of such facts as would have led to the knowledge thereof, if pursued with reasonable diligence. *Burgess v. American Cancer Soc., South Carolina Div., Inc.*, 300 S.C. 182, 386 S.E.2d 798 (Ct. App. 1989). A suspicion alone is not sufficient to place a party on inquiry. *Beattie v. Pool*, 13 S.C. 379 (1880); *Hunt v. Smith*, 202 S.C. 129, 24 S.E.2d 164 (1943). The burden would be on the fiduciaries to show that the contestants had knowledge of the fraud or of such facts as would have led to knowledge if pursued with reasonable diligence. *Grayson v. Fidelity Life Ins. Co.*, 114 S.C. 130, 103 S.E. 477 (1920); *Means v. Feaster*, 4 S.C. 249 (1873); *Richardson v. Mounce*, 19 S.C. 477 (1883). The contestants would also assert that the fraud was continuing, so that any applicable statute of limitations did not commence any sooner than Mr. Brown's death.

The original trustees would be the alleged perpetrators of the fraud. The commission of a fraud or an intentional misrepresentation therefore estops the trustees from asserting any statute of limitations. See *R WE NUKEM Corp. v. ENSR Corp.*, 644 S.E.2d 730 (2007); *Hunter v. American General Life and Acc. Ins. Co.*, slip copy (D.S.C. 2004) (2004 WL 5231631); *Holmberg v. Armbrrecht*, 327 U.S. 392 (1946). Moreover, even if the trustees did not engage in fraud or make intentional misrepresentations, they are estopped from asserting any statute of limitations because the settling parties reasonably relied on the words and conduct of the trustees in allowing any limitations period to expire. See *Regions Bank v. Schmauch*, 582 S.E.2d 432 (Ct.

App. 2003); *Hedgepath v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co.*, 559 S.E.2d 327 (Ct. App. 2001); *Kleckley v. Northwestern Nat. Cas. Co.*, 526 S.E.2d 218 (2000); *Harvey v. South Carolina Dept of Corrections*, 527 S.E.2d 765 (Ct. App. 2000); *Brown v. Pearson*, 483 S.E.2d 477 (Ct. App. 1997).

The fiduciaries assert that the recordation of the certificate of trust commenced the running of the statute of limitations. However, recordation of a deed will not, by itself, be sufficient notice to put a party on inquiry as to the existence of a fraudulent conveyance. *Tucker v. Weathersbee*, 98 S.C. 402, 82 S.E. 638 (1914); *Means v. Feaster*, 4 S.C. 249 (1873).

ii. As to undue influence

Statute of limitations for fraud would not apply to the contestants' claims for undue influence because undue influence is an action in equity. *Dixon v. Dixon*, 362 S.C. 388, S.E.2d 849 (2005).

iii. Tolling as to minors

To the extent that any statute of limitations would apply to the trust contests, the contestants would assert that the statute of limitations would be tolled for a minor, such as [REDACTED]

iv. If the trust is deemed revocable, then SCPC section 62-7-604 provides that the trust contests were timely commenced.

f. One additional salient factor demonstrating the existence of a good faith controversy involves the issue of the ownership of federal copyright termination rights. Federal copyright law provides a termination right to a songwriter who has assigned some or all of his

DAE
#33

copyright rights to a third party, such as a publisher.¹² Testimony revealed, Mr. Brown assigned at least a substantial number of his copyrights to one or more publishers and he assigned to one or more third party entities the remaining rights to a substantial number of his copyrights. Federal copyright law allows a songwriter who is alive after a certain number of years pass from any assignment of some or all of his copyrights to terminate, or revoke, that assignment, thereby regaining control of the assigned right with the freedom to negotiate a new assignment.¹³ However, if the applicable time period for that song has not expired before the songwriter dies, that termination right passes by federal law to the statutory heirs (the surviving spouse and children) regardless of the songwriter's attempt to otherwise transfer the termination right. See 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 203, 304; Ann Bartow, *Intellectual Property and Domestic Relations: Issues to Consider When There Is an Artist, Author, Inventor, or Celebrity in the Family*, 35 Fam. L.Q. 383.

Under the settlement agreement, those settling parties who would qualify as statutory heirs for federal copyright law termination rights purposes have contributed their termination rights, and any proceeds therefrom, to the settlement entity, which includes the charitable beneficiaries. If it were not for this contribution to the settlement entity, there is no way that the charitable beneficiaries could receive any benefits from the federal copyright termination rights.

¹² Typically, the publisher's share of any royalties is 50 percent of the total and the songwriter's share is 50 percent.

¹³ For songs copyrighted before the 1976 copyright act, the time period before the termination rights can be asserted is 56 years from the date copyright was secured. For songs copyrighted after the 1976 copyright act, that time period is 35 years from the assignment.

2. Just and Reasonable

Including those discussed above, there are many reasons supporting the conclusion that the proposed settlement is just and reasonable. The key issue is how the charitable beneficiaries fare under the proposed settlement. I find that the settlement is just and reasonable and provides a just and reasonable result for the charitable beneficiaries.

From the perspective of the charitable beneficiaries, the risks of not approving the settlement agreement are substantial. As discussed above, significant arguments can be made that the 2000 will and trust are not valid. If the 2000 will and trust are overturned, essentially the same arguments can be made that the 1999 will and trust are invalid. If the contestants would prevail in these contests, an intestacy would result and the charitable beneficiaries would get nothing — a substantial risk.¹⁴

Even if the 2000 will and trust (or the 1999 will and trust) are upheld, significant arguments can be made to recognize Mrs. Brown's spousal share claims, as discussed above. No matter Mr. Brown's intent, she would be entitled to one-third of the probate assets plus one-third of the assets in any revocable trust. And unless Mr. Brown demonstrated an intent to override SCPC section 62-2-301 (the omitted spouse's share), which is questionable, Mrs. Brown would be entitled to one-half of the probate estate¹⁵ and likely one-half of the assets of any revocable trust. If Mrs. Brown would prevail in her claims, the charitable beneficiaries' share of the

¹⁴ The risk for the charitable beneficiaries would be enhanced by the burden of proof. Because Messrs. Cannon, Dallas, and Bradley, the original personal representatives and trustees, are the alleged perpetrators of the fraud and undue influence resulting in Mr. Brown's execution of the 2000 will and trust documents, the burden of proof would fall on the proponents of the will and trust because Messrs. Cannon, Dallas, and Bradley were in a confidential relationship with Mr. Brown. *Dixon v. Dixon*, 362 S.C. 388, S.E.2d 849 (2005).

¹⁵ As discussed above, determining the proper ownership of probate and nonprobate assets will be difficult if not impossible.

probate estate and any revocable trust would be reduced by either one-half or one-third — a substantial risk.

Even if the 2000 will and trust (or the 1999 will and trust) are upheld (and even if Mrs. Brown is not entitled to any spousal share), significant arguments can be made to recognize [REDACTED] omitted child claim, as discussed above. Unless Mr. Brown demonstrated an intent to override SCPC section 62-2-302 (the omitted child's share), which is questionable, [REDACTED] would be entitled to his intestate share of the probate estate¹⁶ and likely the same share of the assets of any revocable trust. If [REDACTED] would prevail in his claims, the charitable beneficiaries' share of the probate estate and any revocable trust would be reduced by his intestate share — a substantial risk.

Even if the 2000 will and trust are upheld and the spousal and omitted child's claims are unsuccessful, the time and expense to litigate through appeal all of these and other issues would be extraordinary. The cost to the estate and trust for fees and costs and related expenses are substantive. It has taken more than two years of estate administration and millions of dollars of fees and costs just to get to the point of considering a settlement. The time and expense necessary to carry out all litigation to completion and appeal boggles the mind.

The Court has been apprised as to the distribution of the settling parties' interest as more fully set forth in the settlement agreement, and the settlement agreement has been made a part of the record. The percentages assigned to each settling party are fair and reasonable. The Attorney General's Office has ensured a substantial portion of the Estate will be dedicated to the specific intent of James Brown, that is providing an educational trust. The Court has also considered and

¹⁶ As discussed above, determining the proper ownership of probate and nonprobate assets will be difficult if not impossible.

is satisfied that the minor child, [REDACTED] will receive his share of the estate assets as distributed through his Mother's share and that he will receive another equal portion from his Mother in the form of a second trust.

The protection of a public trust is of paramount concern to the Court and the Court is satisfied that through the diligent efforts of the Attorney General's Office, the assets to fund the public trust will now be available. Furthermore, any issues as to the protection of the minor child's interest have been preserved through this agreement.

Consideration of these factors demonstrates that the allocation of the proposed settlement is just and reasonable. However, an additional, and perhaps substantial additional benefit to the charitable beneficiaries is the contribution by the other settling parties of their federal copyright termination rights. As discussed above, these rights may have considerable value and, without the settlement, the charitable beneficiaries could derive no benefit from these rights.

Replacement of the currently serving fiduciaries is also just and reasonable. The propriety of their appointment as trustees is currently on appeal, and their replacement should moot that issue. Moreover, both fiduciaries testified that they intended to appeal the approval of the settlement; that action would place them in the position of an irreconcilable conflict of interest.

The settling parties propose that Mr. Russell Bauknight be appointed as the replacement personal representative and trustee. I find that he is qualified and willing to serve and suffers from no conflict of interest because the settling parties have all consented to his appointment and, because the settlement agreement places all possible probate estate and trust assets into the same settlement entity, he has no conflict of interest by serving as both personal representative

DAE
#37

and trustee. Pursuant to Mr. Bauknight's testimony, I find that no transition period is necessary before the appointment of Mr. Bauknight to replace Ms. Pope and Mr. Buchanan.

C. Tax Issues

1. Charitable Exemption Concerns

I find that the Settling Parties have carefully considered the impact of the Settlement Agreement and participation in the Settlement Entity and the James Brown Legacy Trust on the tax exempt status of the 2000 "I Feel Good" Trust.

As the Trustee of the 2000 "I Feel Good" Trust will be selected by, and can be removed for any reason by, the South Carolina Attorney General, the Settling Parties believe there is no private inurement problem. Additionally, all transactions between the Brown family members, the 2000 "I Feel Good" Trust, and the James Brown Legacy Trust are at fair market value. The provisions of the James Brown Legacy Trust effectively grant the 2000 "I Feel Good" Trust a veto over major decisions, allowing the 2000 "I Feel Good" Trust sufficient control over the settlement entity to prevent the Settling Parties from conducting the business of the James Brown Legacy Trust in such a manner as to allow them to use the assets or income of the "I Feel Good" Trust for their own private benefit.

Marital Deduction – In order to receive the marital deduction, Tommie Rae Brown must have been the spouse of James Brown. The Attorneys for Mrs. Brown strongly believe that they have sufficient evidence to prevail in a trial on the merits as to whether Tommie Rae Brown was the spouse of James Brown. The other Settling Parties agree that Mrs. Brown has a material chance of success, as they are willing to settle with Mrs. Brown and recognize her status as surviving spouse.

DAE
#38

Charitable Deduction – The Settling Parties recognize that the charitable deduction will be limited to the amount that the 2000 “I Feel Good” Trust actually receives, per Regulation §20.2055-2(d) and Reed v. U.S., 26 AFTR 2d 70-6042 (DC Ill. 1970), and that the amount of the charitable deduction cannot exceed the amount the 2000 “I Feel Good” Trust otherwise would be entitled to under the terms of the Will, per Terre Haut First National Bank v. U.S., 67 AFTR 2d 91-1217 (DC Ind. 1991).

I find that the Settling Parties took the issues discussed above into account in drafting the Settlement Agreement, and, other than the loss of the charitable deduction for assets passing to heirs/devisees other than the 2000 “I Feel Good” Trust, the Settling Parties have planned to preserve the Estate’s right to a charitable deduction for the value of the assets passing to the 2000 “I Feel Good” Trust.

The specific concerns of the Personal Representatives/Trustees, as expressed by their expert witness, Harley Ruff, Esquire, are addressed below.

Attorneys’ Fees – According to the settlement agreement, each party is ultimately responsible for his or her own attorneys’ fees. These fees are therefore not additional costs to the charitable beneficiaries. These attorneys’ fees may be deductible for estate tax purposes. Treasury Regulation §20.2053-3(c)(3) provides “[a]ttorneys’ fees incurred by beneficiaries incident to litigation as to their respective interests are not deductible if the litigation is not essential to the proper settlement of the estate within the meaning of paragraph (a) of this section. An attorney’s fee not meeting this test is not deductible as an administration expense under section 2053 and this section, even if it is approved by a probate court as an expense payable or reimbursable by the estate.” This regulation allows attorneys fees incurred by beneficiaries to be deductible for estate tax purposes if they were incurred in litigation that was

essential to the proper settlement of the estate. The Settling Parties plan to contend that the majority of their legal fees have been incurred in litigation essential to the proper settlement of the Estate and, thus, are deductible by the Estate. By providing a pro-rata reduction of the elements of the Estate which are subject to estate taxes, the net amount to be received by the Settling Parties, including the charitable beneficiaries, would be increased.

The Settling Parties plan to assert that the payment of the Settling Parties' legal fees are deductible as an estate administration expense under §2053. The Settling Parties' legal fees were necessary in determining the proper distribution of the estate due to (i) the alleged undue influence asserted against Mr. Brown, and (ii) establishing Tommie Rae Brown as the spouse of James Brown, and her entitlement to either the elective share or the omitted spouse share. Additionally, the efforts of the Settling Parties, Pope and Buchanan, and their counsel uncovered the mismanagement and misappropriation by the initial fiduciaries and led to their resignation. Pending the outcome of additional litigation, these efforts may lead to the Estate's recovering substantial sums.

Due Diligence – The Settling Parties are aware that it is in the best interest of all beneficiaries of the Estate of Mr. Brown, whether Settling Parties or not, that the Estate minimize any potential estate tax due by Mr. Brown's estate. For that reason, the Settling Parties assert that they have carefully examined the potential estate tax consequences of the Settlement Agreement and are confident that they have drafted the Agreement in such a way as to preserve the charitable and marital deduction to the greatest extent possible in line with the provisions of the settlement.

Effect of Settlement on Charitable Deduction – Mr. Ruff expressed concerns that the structure of the Settlement Agreement and the James Brown Legacy Trust would jeopardize the

charitable deduction because it results in a non-qualified split interest trust under §2055(e)(2). The Settling Parties disagree that a non-qualified split interest trust is created, and, even if it was, assert that the form of the James Brown Legacy Trust can be revised to satisfy the split interest trust rules of §2055(e)(2).

The Settlement Agreement provides that each Settling Party will receive a specified percentage of the Estate assets. These assets are first distributed to and/or are owned by the Settling Parties outright. The Settling Parties have contractually obligated themselves to then contribute these assets to the James Brown Legacy Trust for consolidated management and marketing of the "James Brown assets." The assets do not pass directly from Mr. Brown's estate to the James Brown Legacy Trust. The assets pass directly to the Settling Parties, who in turn contribute these assets to a co-investment entity, the James Brown Legacy Trust. Such co-investment between charitable and non-charitable beneficiaries is specifically permitted by Section 4943 of the Internal Revenue Code.

Even if the IRS or a federal court were to disregard the distribution of assets to the Settling Parties and their subsequent contribution to the James Brown Legacy Trust, and treat the assets of the Estate of James Brown as passing directly to the James Brown Legacy Trust, the Settling Parties could amend the structure of the James Brown Legacy Trust (as they are required under the settlement agreement to do if necessary to preserve the charitable deduction) to allow the contribution to qualify for the charitable deduction. In *Galloway v. U.S.*, 99 AFTR2d 2007-3412, the case cited by Mr. Ruff in support of his opinion that the charitable deduction would not be allowed if the Settlement Agreement were approved, the Court emphasized that there was a single Trust that did not divide until distributions were to be made some years in the future. The Settling Parties believe that amending the James Brown Legacy Trust to provide for a charitable

share, to which the 2000 "I Feel Good" Trust assets would be contributed, and a non-charitable share, to which all other "James Brown assets" would be contributed, is one option that would resolve the issue of the non-qualified split interest trust, if necessary.

2. Self Dealing

Mr. Ruff alleged that the right of first refusal granted to Terry Brown in the Settlement Agreement would constitute self-dealing and would generate an excise tax and/or a loss of charitable exemption for the 2000 "I Feel Good" Trust.

The Settling Parties opine that the granting of the right of first refusal and the exercise of the right of first refusal (presuming such exercise is done while the estate is still open for federal income tax purposes) fall within the "estate administration" exception to self-dealing found in Regulation §53.4941(d)-1(b)(3). If the right of first refusal does not fall within the "estate administration" exception to self-dealing, the Settling Parties could propose that the 2000 "I Feel Good" Trust become a public charity (such as a Supporting Organization supervised and controlled by the South Carolina Attorney General's Office), which is not subject to the self-dealing prohibition.

If the right of first refusal does not meet the "estate administration" exception, and the 2000 "I Feel Good" Trust cannot be converted to a public charity, the Settlement Agreement provides that "[i]f any time any federal or state agency determines that any part of this Addendum shall endanger the tax-exempt status of the Charitable Trust, and that decision becomes final and non appealable, then the parties shall take such curative action as is necessary to prevent any such loss of tax-exempt status by the charitable trust." This type of curative language is used by planners as the ultimate safeguard to prevent charitable exemption problems.

3. Marital Deduction

Mr. Ruff addressed the case of *Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Estate of Bosch*, 387 U.S. 456, 87 S.Ct. 1776, 18 L.Ed.2d 886 (1967), and its impact on the marital deduction. In *Bosch*, the issue of whether the estate was due a marital deduction was dependent on the interpretation of state law (i.e. whether the widow's purported release of a power of appointment was valid). The Supreme Court of the United States ruled that only an opinion of the state's highest court as to a state law issue is binding on federal authorities when applying federal law.

Bosch does not directly affect whether or not the Estate of James Brown will be entitled to a marital deduction for assets that pass to his wife, Tommie Rae Brown. *Bosch* simply states that the IRS and the federal courts are not required to accept a South Carolina court's ruling that Tommie Rae Brown is the spouse unless that ruling comes from the South Carolina Supreme Court. As is the case with any surviving spouse, nothing in *Bosch* prevents the Estate of James Brown from arguing the merits of Tommie Rae Brown's claim that she was the wife of James Brown. If the Estate prevails on the merits of that claim, it will be entitled to a marital deduction for assets that pass to Mrs. Brown, despite the lack of a Supreme Court ruling that she is the wife of Mr. Brown.

4. Private Letter Ruling

The Settling Parties have not yet sought a Private Letter Ruling ("PLR"). *Revenue Procedure 2009-1* states that a PLR is issued only to a "taxpayer" and must be signed by the taxpayer or an "authorized representative." In this case, the Settling Parties have no authority to act on behalf of either the estate or the 2000 "I Feel Good" Trust.

DAE
#2/3

The Settling Parties anticipate that an independent professional fiduciary appointed by this Court will carefully consider whether or not to apply for a PLR on one or more issues, after consulting with the Settling Parties, especially the Attorney General.

Thus, after conducting substantial due diligence with the advice of highly-regarded tax lawyers, including a number of certified tax specialists, the Settling Parties assert that the Settlement Agreement does not disqualify the charitable exemption, cause excise tax problems, or prevent the Estate from receiving a charitable deduction for property passing to the 2000 "I Feel Good" Trust. However, to the extent that there may be a problem, the Settling Parties have a number of options. They can pursue the estate administration exception. They can pursue the conversion of the private foundation to a public charity (which they may choose to do for nontax reasons as well). If such options fail to protect the charitable exemption, the Settling Parties are required by the Settlement Agreement to take whatever curative action is necessary to protect the charitable exemption, which would be enforced by the Attorney General.

IV. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, I find as follows:

1. All necessary parties are properly joined;
2. Notice has been provided to all necessary parties;
3. The settlement agreement has been executed by all persons having beneficial interests which are affected by the compromise;
4. The controversy is in good faith; and
5. The settlement is fair, equitable, and reasonable.

I therefore Order as follows:

1. The settlement is approved;

2. Adele J. Pope and Robert L. Buchanan, Jr., are directed to execute the agreement; and
3. Russell L. Bauknight is immediately appointed as Personal Representative of the Estate and Trustee of the James Brown 2000 Irrevocable Trust in replacement of Ms. Pope and Mr. Buchanan.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED.


The Honorable Doyet A. Early, III

May 26, 2009
Aiken, South Carolina